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Would bank holding companies be a better structure to conduct
universal banking?  The device contains some important ad-
vantages, but the evidence now is limited and unacceptably high
risks for banks could be one result.
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Banking systems in many countries have become  *  Bank regulatory authorities would impose
increasingly unstable in recent years.  At the  little or no supervision on holding company
sanie time, market forces have pushed banks to  units.  Instead, the marketplace would discipline
expand into a variety of universal banking  the financial affairs of these affiliates.
activities, including some that appear to involve
higher risks than traditional banking operadons.  The use of the bank holding company device
to conduct universal banking activities can
Talley notes that these trends have prompted  promise important public benefits including:  (1)
questions about whether restructuring banking  a sounder commercial banking system, (2) less
organizations might permit them to pursue  banking regulation, and (3) greater competitive
universal banking activities without impairing  equality between banking and nonbanking units.
the stability of the banking system.
One major objective of using holding
The basic bank holding company proposal  companies to conduct banking activities is to
contains three major elements:  preserve banking stability. The evidence is
inconclusive on whether holding companies
* Any bank that wants to operate as a univer-  could achieve this goal.
sal bank must first form a holding company and
then conduct all riskier activities in holding  The major risk is that policymakers may tend
company units rather than directly in the bank.  to assume that safeguards protecting b'ynks  are
The bank would continue to engage in traditional  invulnerable and allow holding companies to
banking activities that involve the usual levels of  engage in risky activities they would never
risk.-  consider permitting banks to conduct.  If holding
companies encountered serious problems be-
The government would develop laws and  cause of unduly high risks, banks  rffiliated  with
regulations designed as safeguards to insulate the  them could experience serious damage as a
bank from any financial problems that might  result.
occur in holding company affiliates of the bank.
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In  recent  yrv,rs,  banking  systems  in  many  countries  have  been experiencing
increasing  insta&DLity.  At  the  aame  time,  market  forces  have  been  pushing  kanks
to expand into various  universal  banking  activities,  some  of which appear  to
involve  greater  risks  than  traditional  banking  activities. The  combination  of
theme  two  developments  has  raised  the  question  whether  it  might  be possible  to
regtructur banking  organizations  in order  to permit  them  to pursue  universal
banking  activities  without  impairing  the  stabillty  of  the  banklng  system.
Organizationally,  there  are  three alternative  ways Ln which banking
organizations  can  participate  in  universal  banking  activitles. First,  they  can
conduct these activities  directly in the  bank.  ThLs appears to be  the
arrangement  that  li  most  widely  used. Second,  they  can  conduct  these  activities
in  subsidiaries  of  the  bank,  an  arrangement  that  appears  to  be  increasing  in  use.
Third,  they  can  conduct  these  activities  in  bank  holding  companies  (either  in  the
parent company or in nonbank subsidlaries  of the parent).  To date, this
organizational  arrangement  has not  been  wldely  used,  but  is being  increasingly
discussed  in banking  and  public  policy  circles.
Proponents  of bank holding companies  argue that conducting  universal
banking activities in  holding company afflliates is clearly superior to
conducting  these  activlties  either  dlrectly  in  the  bank  or  in  subsidiaries  of  the
bank.  These advantages  include shielding  the bank agaLnst the risks that
universal banklng activLties  may entail, avoiding  the spread of bank-type
regulation,  and  promoting  a  level  playing  field  between  bankLng  and  nonbanking
competitors.
The  objectLve  of  this  paper  is  to  evaluato  the  bank  holdlng  company  device
as a  vehicle  for  conducting  universal  banking  activittes.  The  paper  identifies
the major issues  lnvolved,  reviews  the empirical  evidence  on the use of the2
holding  company  iL  acture,  and  discusses  several  proposals  to  make  the  use  of the
holding  company  device  more effective  from  a public  policy  perspective.
The naper is divided  into eight sections. Following  this introductory
section,  the  paper  briefly  reviews  the pros  and  cons  of universal  banking.  In
the third  section,  the  basic  features  of the  bank  holding  company  proposal  are
presented  and  explained. In  the  next  two  sections,  the  alleged  advantages  of  the
bank holding  company  proposal  are  presented,  followed  by various  challenges  to
these  alleged  advantages. in the  sixth  section,  the  empirical  evidence  on the
use  of the  holding  company  device  for  conducting  universal  banking  activities  is
reviewed.  Unfortunately,  this  empirical  evidence  is  very  limited  because  only
one  country,  the  United  States,  has  expressly  employed  the  holding  company  device
on a  wide scale  to conduct  universal  banking  activities. In the  next section,
two  variants  of the basic  bank  holding  company  proposal  --  the fail-proof  bank
proposal  and  the  fail-proof  parent  proposal  --  are  presented  and  evaluated.  The
major  conclusions  of the  paper  are  presented  in  the final  section.
ST.  UNIVERSAL  BANKING
The  term  "universal  banking"  does  not  appear  to  have  a  precise  definition.
In general,  however,  the  term  implies  that  banking  organizations  have  powers  to
engage  in  activities  that  go  significantly  beyond  traditional  banking  activities.
Tnese broader activltles  mLght include lendlng and investlng that involve
substantial  term  transformation,  engaging  in  securities  underwriting  and  dealing,
and,  in some countries,  even holding equity positions in commercial and
industrial  companies.
As  indicated  earlier,  there  has  been  considerable  controversy  regarding  the3
morlts  of universal  bankLng. 1 The proponents  of unLvereal  banklng  argut  a  nt
thLs  form  of  bankLng  will  promote  economlc  growth  by  maklng  available  much  needed
long-term  flnancLng  to comerce  and Lndustry.  UnLvereal  banklng also will.
promote  efflcLency  by allowlng  '.Anks  to achLeve  economles  of scale  and scope.
Moreover,  unlversal  bankLng  will foster  competitLon  by opening  up  varlous  areas
of fLnance  for  entry  by banks.
opponents  of  unlversal  bankLng  argue  that  lt  will  dLitort  credlt  allocatlon
because  of  an Lncrease  ln  connected  lendlng.  Also,  unlversal  banking  inevltably
will lead  to a greater  concentratlon  of economLc  resources  and  polltlcal  power.
Further,  unlvereal  bankLng li bound  to l*ad  to confllcts  of '&nterost  --  for
example,  a bank  underwrltlng  securLtLes  for  a troubled  fLrm  where  the  proceeds
of the Lssue  would be used to pay off the bank's  own loan to the company.
FLnally,  and perhaps most important,  unlversal  banklng could lnvolve  banks
engagLng  in  rlsky  actlvitles  that  could  jeopardLze  the stabillty  of the  banklng
system.
The dlfferen¢w  of views regarding  the merlts of unLversal  banking is
reflected  ln  several  World  Bank  reports  over  the  last  decade  or so.  In  the  late
1970s,  the  Dank  staff  recommended  the  implementatlon  of  unLvereal  banklng  in  the
Phlilpplnes. Shortly  thereafter,  the staff  turned  around  and argued  agalnst
unlversal  banklng for Brasll  and Mexlco. 2 The staff's  apparent  inconsistent
approach  may simply  reflect  Maxwell  Fry's  comment:  "There  li, therefore,  no
For  a  detalled  review  of  the  pros  and  cons  of unLversal  banklng,  see  Deena
R. Khatkhate  and  Klaus-Walter  Riechel,  "Multipurpose  Bankings Its  Nature,  Scope
and  Relevance  for  Less  Developed  CountrLes,"  InternatLonal  Monetarv  Fund  Staff
Zaprs,  September  1980,  pp.  478-516.
2  Millard Long, Revlew  of Finanglal  Sector  Work, World Bank, Flnancial
Development  Unlt,  Industry  Department,  October  1983,  p. 40.4
universal  case  for  or  agaLnst  universal  banking." 3
I,'".  THS  BASIC  BANK  HOLDING  COMPANY  PROPOSAL
The  proposal  to  use  bank  holding  companies  to  engage  ln  universal  banking
activitLes  could  take  various  forms.  The  form  used  ln  thle  part  of  the  paper  ia
the  one  that appears  most  frequently  ln pubiLc  polLcy  dLscussions.  This
proposal,  which  will  be  referred  to  as  the  kba  bank  holding  company  proposal,
contains  threo  major  elements.
FLrst,  any  bank  that  wants  to  operate  an a  universal  bank  would  be  required
to form  a  holding  company  and  then conduct  all rLskLer  activitLes  ln holding
company  units,  rather  thsn  directly  ln  the  bank. These  riskler  activities  could
be  conducted  either  ln  the  holdLng  company  ltself,  or In  nonbank  subuidLarLes  of
the  parent  company.  The  bank  would  contlnue  to  engage  ln tradltlonal  banklng
actlvltLes  that  lnvolve  bankable"  rilks.
Second,  the government  would develop laws  and  regulatLons  deslgned  to
inoulate  the  bank  from  any  flntncLal  problems  that  might  occur  ln  holdLng  company
affiliates  of  the  bank. At  a  mLnimum,  these  firewall*  provisions  would  include:
(i)  strict  quantitative  limLtations  on  bank loans  or  other  extensions  of  credit
to holdlng  company  affilLates,  as well as tlght  limits  on bank purchases  of
securLtLes  or  other  assets  from  these  aftflliate.l  (11)  requirements  that  all  bank
transactLons  wlth affiliates  be on "market  terms" --  that ls, on terms and
condltlons  that  are  substantLally  the  same  as  those  on  bank  transactLons  wlth
nonaffLliated  partLes; and (L11)  provisions  that would prevent the holdlng
company from extractLng  excesslve  dlvLdends  from the  bank  that would unduly
'  Maxwell J.  Pry, Money. Interest  and Rankina in Zoo=ic  Develonment
(Baltimore,  Nd.g  John HopkLns  UnLversLty  Press,  1988),  p. 283.5
deplete  the  bank's  capital.
Third,  holding  company  units  wnuld  be subject  to little  or  no supervision
by bank regulatory  authorities. 4 Instead,  the financial  affairs of these
affiliates  would  be disciplined  largely  or entirely  b. the marketplace. The
rationale  for  not  subjecting  holding  company  affiliates  .. o  bank-type  regulatLon
is that it is not  needed  if  the  bank can  be effectively  insulated  from  holding
company  financir.l  problems.
IV.  ALLEGED  ADVANTAGES  OF THE  PROPOSAL
Proponents  of  the basic  bank holding company  proposal  argue that  the
proposal  would  produce  substantial  public  bonefits.  Most  important,  the  proposal
would  allow  the  public  to  derive  the  benefits  of  universal  banking  without
placing  the stablilty  of the banking  system  in  jeopardy.  Th*  bank  holding
company  proposal  also  would minimize  the spread  of bank-t%ype  regulation. By
conducting  rLsky  universal  banking  actlvities  in  holding  company  affiliates,  it
would not be necessary  to subject  these activitLes  to  bank-typ  regulation
because  the  bank  is protected  by  flrewall.  By  contrest,  if  these  risky
activitLes  were  conducted  directly  in  the  bank,  or  even  subs.4-aries  of  the  bank,
these  activities  almost  surely  would  be subject  to bank-typ roqulation. As a
result,  the  movement  to  universal  banking  probably  would  result  over  time  in  the
spread of  bank-type regulation throughout  much of  the  financial system.
Moreover,  it  would  tend to result  in regulatory  duplication  Ln  those  flnancLal
industries  (such  as  securitLes  and  insurance)  that  are  probably  already  subject
Holding  company  affiliates  participating  ln  certaLn  nonbanking  activities
might  be  subject  to  regulation  by  other  government  agencies.  For  example,  if  an
afflilate  eng*ges  in  securities  underwriting  and  deallng,  this  actLvlty  might  be
supervised  by  a  securities  regulatory  authority.6
to regulation  by "functional"  regulator.
Another  advantage  of the bank holding  company  prorosal  is that it would
place  banking  and  nonbanking  competLtors  on a level  playlng  fleld. Flrst,  both
banking  and  nonbanking  rLvals  would  be subject  to essentially  the  same  amount  of
regulation.  By  contrast,  if  universal  banking  actlvities  were  conducted  directly
in  the  bank,  or in  subeidLarius  of the  banks,  the  bank  would  be subject  to  bank-
type regulation,  whereas Lts nonbanking  rivals  wouldn't.  Second, the bank
holdinq  company  proposal  would  promote  competltlve  equality  ln the funding  of
universal  banking  actlvitles.  If  these  activities  were  condupted  direftly  ln  the
bank,  banks  would  tend  to have  a lower  cost  of funds  because  banks  are  protected
by the government  through  such devices  as deposit lneurance  and access  to a
lender  of last resort.  Under the bank holdlng company  proposal, however,
activities  would have to be conducted  in holding  company  affillates.  These
affiliates would  have to  do  their own  funding in  the  m£rketplave or,
alternatively,  if funded  by the bank,  would be .equired  to pay market  rates.
Consequently,  holding  company  affiliates  could  not  gaLn  a  funding  advantage  over
thelr  nonbank  rivals.
V.  CHALLENGES  TO THE  ALLEGED  ADVANTAGES
On first  view,  the  baesc  bank  holding  company  proposal  seems  to represent
an  extremely  attractive  way  to  allow  banking  organliations  to  engage  ln  unlvereal
banklng.  The proposal  holds out the promise  that universal  bankLng can be
conducted wlthout  jeopardLzing  banklng stability or  sprertiUng  bank-type
regulation  throughout  the financlal  sector,  and also would place  banking  and
nonbanklng  competitors  on a  level  playLng  field.
However, these alleged advantages  of the bank holding company7
proposal  have  been subject  to s*rious  challenges.  The  most  Lmportant  of  these
challengas  Le that  lt  may  not  be  possLble  to  insulate  banks  from  holdLng  company
problems.  f  the  flrewalls  develop  cracks,  most  of  the  alleged  advantages  of  the
proposal  would  dLiappear. There  are  thr--  ways that holdLng  company  problems
mlght  spill  over  onto banks.
flrst,  lf a  holdLng  company  affliLatu  fails,  credLtors  of the affillate
might successfully  sue the bank to honor  the debts  of lts afflILate. Such a
court rullng  li referred  to as "pLercLng  the corporate  veil"  and effectlvely
nullifies  the  technlcal  legal  separatlon  of affillated  corporatLons.
The  wllingness  of  courts to  plerce the  corporate veLl could vary
conslderably  from country  to country,  depanding  on the laws of the varlous
countrLes  and  how  courts  have  chosen  to interpret  these  laws  over  tlme. What  can
be  said,  however,  is  that courts  in  many countrles  have  been  willing  to pLerce
the corporate  vell under certaLn  cLrcumstances. In partlcular,  courts  have
permLtted  piercing  ln cases  where  the  business  a.efaLre  of affillates  have  been
extensively  commLngled,  the  affiliates  have  operated  or held  themselves  out  to
the public  as a single  entlty,  or the polLcLes  of the falled  affillate  were
dlrected to the interest  of survlvlng affillates,  rather than to  lts own
interests.
Second,  holding  company  problems  may  be transmitted  to banks  Ln  the form
of adverse  transactLons.  Even  wlth  lawc  JeLigned  to  prevent  such  transactLons,
banklng  authoritles  may  not  be  able  to  prevent  them  in all  cases. One  reason  le
that examiners  who would monitor  these transactlons  cannot  be entlrely  sure
whether  some  transactLons  are  on terms  that  are  entirely  fair  to the  bank.  For
example,  lt is difficult  for an examiner  to determlne  whether  the amount  of
management  fees  that the  bank pays  the holdlng  company  is approprlate  for  the8
servicas  rendered  to  the  banks Likewise,  iiithin  a  cartaln  range,  it  is  dlfflcult
for an  examlner  to judge  whether  the  tax  payment  that the bank makes to the
holdlng  company  to  cover  the  bank's  share  of  the  cunsolidttsd  organization's  tax
llabillty  is  approprlate,  or  whether  the  bank,s  operations  have  been  manipulated
ln varlous  ways  to maximize  this  ttnx  payment.
in  ads.tion to the  problem, of  effectively  monitoring intercompany
transactlono,  it  is poselble  that desperate  holdlng  company  management  will
knowlngly  vlolate  banking  laws  by forclng  the  bank  to  bail  out  a  falling  holding
company  affilLate.  In banking,  the  pressurea  to avoid a  fai -re are great
because  banking  is preeminently  a  reputation  business.
The  third  way  that  holding  company  financlal  problems  could  be  tranumitted
to the bank is through  a  loss  of market  confldence  in the bank.  This loss  of
confLdence  might occur  because  deposltors  closely  identlfy  the bank with the
holding  company. In  other  words,  depoostors  viow  the  entire  bank  holding  company
organization  as  a  slngle  entity,  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  organization  actually
is  composed  of a number  of legally  separate  corporate  ertltles.
There  are  a  number  of reasons  why  market  participants  may  view  the  entire
holding  company  organLzation  as a single  entity.  One reason  is that holding
companies  often try to project  a single  entity  image  through such  devices  as
giving  similar  names  to their  various  units.  This device  could  capitalize  on
name  recognltlon  and  the  organization's  favorable  reputation  in  the  marketplace.
Another  reason  is that  holding  companles  usually  operate  thelr  organization  as
a  single  entity,  rather  than  as  a  group  of  unrelated  units. Market  participants
perceLve  thli  managerial  approach  and are in&iuenced  by lt.  Flnally,  holding
companies are likely  to do most or all of their flnancial  reporting  on a
consolidated  basis. Thli  practice  tends  to  foster  a slngle  entity  perception  in9
the  marketplace. It  also  maker,  it  difficult  for  market  participarnts  to  evaluate
the  financial  condition  of  individual  u-its  in  the  holding  company,  including  the
bank.
Even if market participants  were not conditioned  to vlew bank holding
companies  as  a oingle  entity,  they  still  might  commence  a  run  on the  bank if  an
important  holding  company  unit  failed. One  reason  is  that  major  units  of  holding
companies usually are  managed by  essentially  the  same group of  people.
Consequently,  if  one  holding  company  affiliate  has  been  seriously  mismanaged,  it
is not unreasonable  for  market  participants  to assume  that  other  units  in the
organization,  including  the bank, may be in trouble too.  Moreover,  market
participants  might  fear  that the  bank may  be abused  in a desperate  attempt  by
holding  company  management  to bail  out  the troubled  affiliate.
As  discussed  earlier,  one  of  the  alleged  aevantages  of  the  holding  company
proposal  is that it  would  avoid  spreading  bank-type  regulation  throughout  much
of the  finpncial  system. This  contentlon  rests  on the  assumption  that  banks,  in
fact, can be effectively  insulated.  If  it is subsequently  discovered  that
Jnoulation  does not work, it is probable  that the government  would subject
holding companies to bank-type regulation,  thereby spreading  this type of
regulation  to other  areas  of finance. In addition,  if  holding  companied  were
subsequently  subjected  to  bank-type  regulation,  another  alleged  advantage  of  the
proposal  --  the  equal  regulatory  treatment  of  banking  and  nonbanking  competitors
--  would be eliminated.
Finally,  it is alleged  that the holding  company  proposal  would promote
competitive equ&lLty by  removing banking organization's  inherent funding
advantage  over  nonbanking  firms. It  appears  that  this  contention  has  been  almost
universally  accephed  in public  policy  discussimns. In fact,  the argument  is10
oariously  flawed. As discussed  earlier,  the  funding  advantage  would  presumably
be eliminated  because  any  bank funding  of holding  company  affiliates  would  have
to be on  market  terms. The  crucial  implicit  assuzmption  in  the argument  is  that
these alfiliates  would  then  use this regulatory  mandated  cost  of funds  as the
basis for setting  pricds for services  offered  the public.  In fact, it is
unlikely  that  the affiliate  would  use itz  gwn cost  of funds  because  this cost
merely represents  an internal  transaction  between two  units in the  same
organization.  Consequently,  this  cost  figure  would  have  no  implications  for  the
consol.dated  organization and would not  be  used by  a  profit maximizing
organization  to set prices.  Instead,  the organization  would use the bank's
"subsidized* cost  of  funds,  because this  represents the  consolidated
organization's  external  borrowing  cost. In final  analysis,  the  only  way  that  a
banking  organization's  funding  advantage  can  be removed  is  to prohibit  the  bank
from  funding  affiliates,  thereby  forcing  these  affiliates  to  do  their  own  funding
in  the  marketplace,  presumably  at "nonsubsidized"  market  rates.
VI.  EMPIRICAL  3VID'NCE  ON INSULATION
Whether banks can be effectively  insulated  from financial  problems  in
holding  companies  is  ultimately  an  empirical  question. Unfortunately,  there  Is
at present  only  very limited  empirical  evidence  on this crucial  issue. Flrst,
there  appears  to be only one country  --  the  United  States  --  where banks  have
made a concerted  effort  to convert  to the  holding  company  form  of organization
in  order  to  engage  in a broader  range  of activitie than existing  laws  permit
banks  to  conduct.  Second,  even  though  the  holding  company  form  of organization
is  pervasive  in  the  American  banking  system,  there  have  been  very  few  real  tests
of the firewalls  concept. One  reason  is  that policymakers  have  placed  fairly11
strict limitations on the universal banking activities of holding companies.
Consequently,  these  nonbank activities  often are  not  large enough  to  cause
serious problems for the consolidated organization.  In addition, since the mid
1970s, holding  company  nonbar.king  activities  have  been  subjected  to  close
supervision by the Federal Reserve.  This supervision has tended to constrain
risk taking, and probably has led to fewer financial problems than otherwise
would have occurred.
However, there have  been two cases in  the  United States that clearly tested
the insulation concept.  The first occurred in 1973 and involved a small bank
holding company in  California named Beverly Hills Bancorp.  This holding company
owned Beverly Hills National Bank, but also was involved in making commercial
real  estate loans  that were funded  by commercial paper.  When one of the holding
company's large borrowers defaulted, the holding company was unable to pay off
its maturing  commercial  paper  and  was  placed  in  bankruptcy.  The  adverse
publicity that accompanied the bankruptcy, and the close public identification
of the bank with the holding ccLpany, resulted in large scale runs on Beverly
Hills  National  Bank.  These  runs  required  bank  supervisors  to  merge  this
illiquid, but solvent, bank into another bank.
The second, and far more important, test occurred in 1975 and involved
Hamilton Bankshares.  This holding company owned Hamilton National Bank, one of
the largest banks  in the State of Tennessee.  In the early 1970s under new,
aggressive  management, the holding company set up a  mortgage banking company and
proceeded  to expand the company's operations  very rapidly.  Within a short period
of time, the mortgage company had a large amount of nonperforming loans and was
experiencing funding  problems.  In  order to  save  the  mortgage company,  management
arranged  for Hamilton  National  Bank  to buy  a  large amount  of  the  troubled12
mortgages.  These transactions, which  were in  clear violation of existing  banking
laws, subsequently caused  the bank to fail.  At the time of the failure, Hamilton
National Bank was the third largest bank failure in American history.
The  Beverly  Hills and  Hamilton cases  understandably have raised  some  degree
of skepticism in the United States regarding the ability to insulate banks from
holding company financial problems.  Yet, it is important  to recognize that both
of these  cases  occurred  about  15 years  ago, and  one  involved  a relatively
insignificant  bank.  Consequently, while these  cases lend some  weight against the
firewalls concept, they definitely do not constitute conclusive evidence.
There  are  several other  aspects of the  American  experience  with  bank
holding companies that are worth noting.  First, in the two cases where the
firewalls were  tested, the firewalls cracked  for different  reasons.  In the
Beverly Hills case, the  spillover effect took the  form of  a loss of market
confidence in the bank.  In the Hamilton case, the spillover effect  involved
massive adverse transactions.  So far, there have been no cases where American
banks have been  "pierced" and  forced to honor  the debts of holding  company
affiliates.  Moreover, there is almost universal agreement among lawyers, bank
regulators and academics that courts in  the United States are  unlikely to pierce
the corporate  veil, except in  extraordinary cases involving gross commingling of
the business affairs of separately incorporated entities.
Second, it is instructive to note how the Federal Reserve, the supervisor
of bank holding companies in the United States, reacted to the Beverly Hills and
Hamilton  failures.  Prior to these failures, the  Federal Reserve had relied
largely on  the  market  to  discipline  the  financial  affairs  of bank  holding
companies and their nonbanking affiliates.  Shortly after the failures, however,
the Federal  Reserve changed its  policy  and began  to subject holding companies and13
their  nonbank  affiliates  to  bank-type  regulation, including  on-site  examinations,
off-site surveillance and ertensive financial reporting (including  reports on a
wide  variety  of  transactions  bp,.ween  holding  company  units  and  the  bank).
Mcreover, it  appears that the Federal Reserve still does not have great faith in
the iirewalls concept, because the Federal Reserve has continued to subject bank
holding companies to strict  bank-type regulation, even though there have been no
known spillover problems since the mid 1970s.
Finally, there may be some  marginal benefit in reflecting on the following
statement relating to the insulation question that was made a few years ago by
Walter Wriston, the former Chairman of Citicorp.
"It  is inconceivable that any  major  bank would walk away
from any subsidiary of its holding company.  1' your
name is  on the door, all of your capital funds are  going
to be behind it in the real world.  Lawyers can say you
have separation, but the marketp  .lace is persuasive, and
it would not see it that way."
VII.  OTHER PROPOSALS
While the basic bank holding company proposal conceivably could produce
important  public benefits, these benefits are crucially dependent on the ability
to insulate banks from holding company financial problems.  As indicated in the
-ast  two sections, there are certain reasons, as well as some limited empirical
evidence,  for  doubting  that  insulation  will  actually  work.  Given  this
skepticism, two other proposals --both variants of the basic proposal --  have
been developed.  The better known variant is usually referred to as the fail-
proof bank (or  narrow bank) proposal.  The other variant is known as the fail-
s  Financial Institutions Restructurina and Services Act of 1981, Hearings
before the  Senate Committee on Banking,  Housing and Urban  Affairs, 1981,  pp. 589-
90.14
proof parent proposal.  Both proposals are designed to make  insulation more
effective than it would be in the basic bank holding company proposal.
Fail-Proof Bank Proposal
The fail-proof bank proposal is essentially an extreme form of the basic
bank  holding  company  proposal  previously  discussed.6 The  fail-proof  bank
proposal would  force banks to separate their traditional deposit  issuing and
lending functions.  Once the proposal is implemented, banks  would be confined to
issuing  deposits and investing in virtually risk-free assets, such as short-term
government securities or perhaps high quality commercial paper.  All previous
bank activities that involved  any  meaningful degree of risk would be transferred
to holding company affiliates.  These affiliates also would do all of the future
lending for the banking organization.
Under the proposal, banks would be required to closely match their asset
and liability maturities to virtually eliminate interest rate risk.  Moreover,
banks  would be  prohibited from  engaging in  bond trading, :oreign  exchange trading
or  conducting various off balance sheet activities.  Banks also  would be required
to have  a  small  amount  of  capital  that  would  be  sufficient  to  absorb  any
remaining,  unavoidable risks. Any transactions between a fail-proof  bank and its
holding company affiliates would have to be on market terms, and examiners would
closely monitor all intercompany  transactions to make sure  that the bank was not
abused.
Because fail-proof  banks  would be  virtually risk-free,  the  government could
fully insure  all bank deposits  without exposing  the government to any significant
6  rhe  fail-proof  bank  proposal  was  originally  e 4 seloped  by  Robert  J.
Lawrence, and was subsequently elaborated upon by Robert Litan  in  a  Brookings
Institution  study.  See  Robert  J.  Lawrence,  "Minimizing  Regulation  of  the
Financial Servlces Industry," Issues in Bank Requlation, (Summer 1985), pp. 22-
31;  and  Robert  Litan,  What  Should  Banks  Do?,  The Brookings Institution, 1987.15
loses,  From a depositor's perspective, this insurance  would constitute a  strong
second line of defense behind a virtually risk-free bank.
A final feature of the proposal is that holding company affiliates would
not be  subject  to bank-type regulation.  Instead, these  affiliates would  be
disciplined solely by the market.
The great virtue of the fail-proof bank proposal in that it would  give
banks  almost perfect  insulation against  holding company  financial  problems.
First, the proposal would essentially eliminate any possibilty  that the bank
would be pierced.  The reason is that the severe restrictions imposed on fail-
proof banks would  make  it virtually  impossLble  for them  to commingle  their
business affairs with those of  their affiliates.  Second, fail-proof  banks would
be exposed to only minimal risks of adverse transactions because the banks could
not lend to affiliates and could purchase only virtually risk-free assets from
affiliates.  These two types of transactions are potentially the most dangerous
ones that banks can have with affiliates.  Third, and most important, fail-proof
banks  would not be  threatened by a loss  of market confidence if  a holding company
affiliate failed.  The reason is that depositors would know that the bank was
virtually risk-free and  that their  deposits were fully insured  by  the government.
Moreover,  in  the  extremely  unlikely  event  that  depositors  lgnored  these
protections, the bank would be ln an excellent position to withstand a run.  The
bank's portfolio would be composed entirely of short-term assets that either
would mature within a very short perLod, or could be sold at very little or no
loss.  Further, the bank would have access  to the lender  of last  resort and  would
have a large portfolio of acceptable collateral.
The fall-proof  bank  proposal .iould  mLnimize the amount  of regulation of the
banklng system.  As stated above, there would be  no need to regulate holding16
company  affiliates  because  banks  would  be  almost  perfectly  insulated  from  holding
company  problems.  In  addition,  the  proposal  wculd  permit  a  substantial  cutback
in  the  existing  regulation  of  banks. For  example,  the  banking  agencies  would  no
longer  have  to revLew  banks,  loan  portfolios,  a  partlcularly  time  consuming  and
expensive  affair. Instead,  the  examination  of fail-proof  banks  would  be limited
largely  to determining  whether  the banks  were in compliance  with the special
requirements  for faLl-proof  banks,  whether  any  bank transactions  with holding
company affiliates  were on market terms, and whether there had been any
misappropriation  of bank funds.
The  fail-proof  bank proposal also would get high marks in promoting
competitive  equality  between  banking  organizations  and  their  nonbanking  rivals.
First, by prohibiting  banks from lending to affiliates  and forcing these
affiliates  to do their own furding,  the proposal  would prevent banks from
transferring  their  inherent  funding  advantage  to their  affliLates.  Second,  the
proposal  would subject  holding  company  affiliates  and nonbanking  firms  to the
same  degree  of regulation.  Under  the  proposal,  holding  company  affiliates  would
not be subject to bank-type  regulation.  As a result, in those nonbanking
actlvLties  that  are  regulated,  these  affiliates  would  be supervised  only  by the
traditional  functional  regulator,  as would  their  nonbanking  rivals.  In those
nonbanking  activities  that  are  not  regulated,  both  holding  company  affiliates  and
theLr nonbanking rivals would be  subject only to the  discipline of  the
marketplace.
From  the  perspective  of  achieving  public  benefits  from  the  transfor  of  risk
within  a  banking  organizatLon,  the  fail-proof  bank  proposal  is  clearly  superior
to the  basic  bank  holding  company  proposal. The  reason  is  that with  the fail-
proof  bank  prcjposal,  public  benefits  are  virtually  assured  becauso  the  effective17
insulatLon  of banks  Lo  basically  guaranteed. By contrast,  wLth the basic  bank
holding  company  proposal,  public  beneflts  are  problematic  because  the  effective
insulatLon  of banks  is in question.
If  the  fail-proof  bank  proposal  can  produce  vLrtually  assured,  major  public
benefLts,  why  hasn't  it  been  used?  The  answer  is  that its  implementatlon  might
not  be feasible.? First,  the  proposal  would  requir.  a  wrenchLng  change  in the
structure  and  operation  of  the  banking  and  fLnancLal  system. Under  the  proposal,
banks could,  continue  tco  hold only a small  portion  of their exLstlng  assets.
Consequently,  banks  either  would  have  to sell  most of their  assets  in the  open
market  or sell them internally  to holding  company  affilLates. Both types  of
asset  sales  would  produce  major  problems,  particularly  sLnce  the  entire  banking
system  presumably  would  be selling  assets  at about  the same  time.  Large  asset
sales  in  the  open  market  would  drive  down  market  prices,  thereby  causing  banks
to incur  capital  losses. Large  asset  sales  to holdlng  company  affiliates  would
require  these  affiliates  to do a large  amount  of flnancing,  thereby  driving  up
thelr  cost  of funds.
Another  problem is that there might not be enough  virtually risk-free
assets  in  existence  for  banks  to hold.  Indeed,  there  are  probably  few, if  any,
financlal  systems  in  the world  where  the amount  of virtually  risk-free  assets
exceeds  the amount  of bank deposits.  In this case, the only way that the
proposal  could  be implemented  would  be  to relax  the  requirement  that  banks  hold
virtually  rlsk-free  assets. If  this  were  done,  however,  the  basic  character  of
the proposal  changes  from  a fail-proof  bank proposal  to a "somewhat  less  than
7  For  a  detailed  discuseLon  of why  the fail-proof  bank  proposal  may not  be
feasLble  ln the United  States,  see Robert  J. Lawrence  and Samuel H. Talley,
"Implementing  a  Fall-Proof  Banking  System,"  Proc-adina.  of  a  Conferonce  on  Bank
Strumture  and  Coetition,  Federal  Roserve  Bank  of  ChLcago,  May  1988,  pp.  344-59.18
fail-proof  bank"  proposal.  And  with  this  change,  the  assurance  that  banks  will
be  totally  lnoulated  and that  public  beneflts  will  bo achieved  begins  to  slip.
in sum,  the faLl-proof  bank proposal  Lnvolves  an inevitable  trade off  between
achieving  public  benefits  and  the  feasibilLty  of implementP- the proposal.
FAil-Proof  PArent  Prgogal
The  falL-proof  parent  proposal  iL  another  variant  of  the  basic  bank  holding
company  proposal,  although  a  considerably  less  extreme  one  than  the  fail-proof
bank  proposal. 8 Like  the  basic  proposal,  the fail-proof  paront  proposal  would
require  banking  organizations  to transfer  relatively  risky  activities  (but  not
all  activities  involving  risk)  from  the  bank  to the  holding  company. However,
unlike  the basic proposal,  which  would allow these rlskier activities  to be
conducted  either  in  the  parent  company  or  nonbank  subsidiaries  of  the  parent,  the
fail-proof  Farent  proposal  would  require  these  actLvities  to  be  conducted  only
in  nonbank  affiliates.  The  reason  is  to  assure  that  the  parent  company  would  not
fail  as  the  result  of sustaLning  large  operating  losses. Another  major  feature
of  the  proposal  is to prohibit  the parent  company from losuLng  debt.  This
provision  would  assure  that  the  parent  would  not  fail  because it  could  not
service  its  debt  obllgations.
The  proposal  also would prohibit  banks from  engaging  in  most  types  of
transactLons  with  holding  company  affiliates,  such  as lending  or  the  purchase  of
assets.  Only  transactions  that  are  essential,  *uch  as  paying  dividends  and
'  The  fail-proof  parent  proposal  was originally  developed  by staff  of the
Federal Reserve Board in the mid  1970s.  The proposal was presented for
consideration  by the Board  in 1975,  but  was not  implemented. For  a discussion
of the-proposal,  see  Robert  J. Lawrence  and Samuel  H. Talley,  "An  Alternative
Approach  to Regulating  Bank  Holding  Companies,"  Proceedinas  of a Conference  on
Bank  Structure  an  C2mnetiion, Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  1978,  pp.  1-10.
For a  more recent  discussion,  see Robert  J. Lawrence,  "Holding  companies  and
Deregulation,"  Proceedins of a Conference  on  Dank  Struture  nd  Competition,
Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Chicago,  1983,  pp. 39-52.19
making  tax  payments  to  the  parent,  would  be  permitted,  and  theeo  would  be  subject
to close  oversight  by bank supervisors  to  prevent  any abuse  of the  bank.
It should  be noted  that under  the fail-proof  parent  proposal,  nonbank
affiliates  probably  would do most of their own funding.  However,  the parent
company  could issue stock and use dividend  income  to fund these affiliates.
Also,  the  holding  company  could  set  up a financLng  subsidiary  that could  raLse
funds  for  the  nonbank  affiLiates. ThLi  procedure  could  centrallze  funding  for
the  entire  nonbanking  part  of  the  holding  company  organization,  thereby
exploitlng  any  economies  of  scale  that  might  be  involved.
Under the fail-proof  parent  proposal,  nonbank  affLILates  would not be
regulated  and  supervlsed  by  banking  authorities.  Instead,  these  affiliLates  would
be subject  only to the  diseipiLne  of the  marketplace.
The  crucLal  asumptLons  underlying  the  fall-proof  parent  propooal  are: (i)
it  makes  a  differenca  where  risky  activities  are  conducted  in  the  holding  company
structural  and  (LL)  it L  better  for  these  activlties  to  be conducted  in  nonbank
subsLdlarles  of  the  parent  than  ln  the  parent  company  ltself. The  reason  is  that
the  failure  of  a  nonbe  k  affiliate  L  likely  to  have  a  signifLcantly  less  adverse
effect  on  market  psychology,  and  would  be less  likely  to cause  a  loos  of public
confldence  ln the bank,  than would  the failure  of the parent.  In a holding
company  organLzatLon,  the  parent  is  a  partleularly  important  entlty. It is  the
top tler  of the  organLzatLon  and,  even  more $mportant,  lt ls the  entity  whose
stock  is  held  by  the  public. aLven  these  factors,  lt  ls  hard  to imagLne  that  the
fallure  of the parent  would  not Lnflict  severe  reputatLon  damage  on the bank.
By contrast,  a  nonbank affiliate  li only a branch ln the holdlng company
structure,  and lts  stock  ls not  held  by the  public. Consequently,  the failure
of a nonbank  affliLate  probably  would  not  lnflict  as  much reputation  damage  on20
the  bank. Moreover,  if  the  parent  company  is  debt  free,  the  failure  of  a  nonbank
affiliate  would  not  cause  the  failure  of  the  parent,  and  the  continued  existence
of the highly  visible  parent  should  help to sustain  public  confidence  ln the
bank.
In addition  to giving  banks greater insulation,  the fall-proof  parent
proposal  ham  several  other  desirable  features. First,  by  not  subjecting  holding
company  affiliates  to  regulation  by  the  banking  authorities,  it  would  not  spread
bank-type  regulation  throughout  the financial  sector  or result in regulatory
duplication. Second,  the proposal  would  promote  competitive  equality  between
banking  and  nonbanking  rivals: (i)  by  subjecting  them  to  sLmilar  regulation;  and
(ii)  by removing  the inherent  funding  advantage  of banking  organizations  by
prohibiting  banks from  lending  to their  nonbank  affiliates.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
This  paper  has dealt  with the  question  whether  it  would  be deairable  to
conduct  universal  banking  activities  (or at least those  that are relatively
risky) in bank holding companies,  rather than directly in banks.  Stated
differently,  from a publie policy perspective,  does it make any sense to
encourage  or force  the  transfer  of risk  among  units  of a banking  organization?
The  major  conclusions  of thu  study  are  as follows:
1.  The use of the bank holdlng  company  devlce  for  conducting  universal
banking  activities  holds  out the  promise  of important  public  benefits. These
beneflts  includes (l)  a  sounder  commercSal  banking  system;  (Li)  a  redu-tIon  in
banking  regulation;  and (lii)  greater  competitlve  equality  between  banking  and
nonbanking  units.  However,  theme benefits  are critlcally  dependent  on the
abillty  to Lnoulate  banks from future  problems  that might arise in holdlng21
company  affiliates. There  are three  bailc  ways that holdlng  company  problems
could  bo transoLtted  to banks  (L)  through  piercLng  the corporate  veill (LL)
through  adverse  transactLonug  and (LLL)  through  a loss  of market  confLdence  ln
the  bank.  The  fLrat  two  spillover  effects  would  Lnflict  losses  on the  bank  and
erode the bank'  capital.  The thLrd  would result  in the bank experlenclng
liquldlty  problems  that  mlght  force  the  bank to sell  assets  at a loss.
2. At  present,  there  is  no conclusive  empLrLcal  evidence  on  whether  banks
can be offectLvely  lnoulated  from holding  company flnancial  problems.  Bank
holdlng  companles  have  been  used  extensively  as  a  devlce  for  conductLng  unLvereal
banklng  actlvLtLes  ln  only  one  country,  the  UnLted  States,  and  tha  evldence  from
that  country  la very  llmlted.  In  those  two  cases  where  holdLng  company
affillaues  experLenced  major  fLnancLal  trouble,  the  problems  dld  spill  over  onto
the  bank and  caused  the  bank  to  fail.
3.  Public  polLcymakers  can  do  much  to  prevent  banks  from  bolng  pLerced  by
requLrLng  banks  not  to  commLngle  thelr  business  affairs  wlth  holdLng  company
affliLates.  Likewise,  polLcymakers  can  mlnlmize  the  likelihood  of  banks  being
forced  lnto  adverse  transactLons  by:  prohlbitlng  all  bank  transactLons  wlth
affillates  except  those  that  are  eseentLal  (such  as  paying  dLvldends  and  taxes
to  rhe  parent  company)t  havLng  bank  supervisors  closely  monltor  these  essentLal
transactlons  to  assure  that  the  bank  is  not  abused;  and  imposing  stiff  penalties
for  vlolatilng  rulae  governlng  bank  transactions  with afflilates.
4.  it is  much  harder  to  prevent  a  loss  of  market  confidence  ln  a bank if
holdlng  company  affillates  get into trouble.  In thli event,  deposLtors  are
likely  to  commence  a  run  on the  bank  because  they  typlcally  do not  have  detalled
lnformatlon  on  the  condition  of  the  bank,  and  they  are  aware  that  *esentLally  the
same  people  usually  manage  both  the  holding  company  and  the  bank.  Consequently,22
depositors  are  likely  to play lt  safe and  assume  that if  the  holdLg company  iL
in  trouble,  the  bank  way  be  ln trouble  too.
S.  One way to vlrtually  eliminate  the  poslbility that holding  company
problems  would  lead  to  bank  runs  lo  to  requlre  banks  to  be  fall-proof.  However,
the  process  of  convertlng  banks  lnto fail-proof  lnstltutLons  would probably
result  ln  unacceptable  shocks  to  the flnancial  system.  A loess  extreme  proposal
that  would  reduce,  but  not  eliminate,  the  prospect  of bank runs  would  requires
(ij  universal  banklng  activltles  to  be  conducted  ln  nonbank  subsidlarles  of  the
parent  company,  rather  than  dlrectly  in  the  parent;  and  (Li)  the  parent  company
to  be  debt-free  (or  at  least  lowly  leveraged).  wlth  these requlrements,  bank
runs would be less llkely  because the hlghly  veisble parent company  would
survlve.
6.  While a  major objectlve of having unlversal banklng actlvities
conducted  ln  holding  companles  is  to  preserve  banklng  stabllity,  lt is  possible
that  lt  could  have  the  opposlte  effect. The  major  rlsk  is  that  policymakers  wlll
assume  that the flrewall.  protectlng  banks are imprognable  and allow holding
companies  to engage ln hlghly  risky  actlvlties  that pol-cymakers  would never
conslder  permitting  banks  to  conduct.  If  holdlng  company  affiliates  subsequently
encountered  serious  problems  and  lt turns  out that  tho flr6walls  have cracks,
banks could  be serlously  harmed.  It also should  be recognlzed  that having
unlversal  banklng actlvltles  ln holdlng  companles  could concentrate  specific
types  of rlske  in  a  number  of lndividual  holdlng  company  afflilates,  rather  than
havlng  a  wide dlversification  of risks  ln  one  unit,  the  bank.23
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